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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
PEARL TOPANOTES,

Case No. 990708 -CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

Defendant Pearl Topanotes has appealed the trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The facts of the case
reflect that officers were investigating the residential address of an arrested person,
Glenna Thomas, when they encountered Topanotes on foot outside her home. Officers
asked Topanotes for an identification card, and when she produced the requested
information, they retained the card for the purpose of running a warrants check. The
check revealed warrants outstanding for Topanotes's arrest. Officers arrested Topanotes
and searched her incident thereto. In connection with the search, officers discovered
heroin, which gave rise to the possession charge in this case.
During a hearing on the matter, Topanotes argued to the trial court that officers
engaged in an unlawful level-two seizure/detention under Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1
(1968), where they retained possession of her identification card to conduct the warrants
check. The level-two detention was unlawful since officers failed to identify reasonable
articulable suspicion that Topanotes was engaged in criminal activity to justify the
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detention. See Salt Lake City v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55, 390 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
The trial court disagreed with Topanotes and ruled the officers engaged in a levelone voluntary encounter under Terry. According to the court "there was absolutely no
testimony that [Topanotes] was compelled to remain" while officers retained possession
of her identification card. Rather, "she remained cooperatively, because the police did
not in any way restrict her freedom to leave nor did she voice any objection." (R. 98:45.) The trial court's analysis was incorrect. See Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f^f 13-17.
The state agrees. The encounter escalated to an unlawful level-two detention. As
the state recognizes,
A level two detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Id. at ^[18. Officers Hansen and Mitchell made plain that they did not
suspect defendant of solicitation or other criminal behavior when they approached
to question her about Thomas, the prostitute they had just arrested, and whose
identity and residence they were attempting to verify (R. 88:16, 28). Absent
reasonable suspicion that defendant was herself soliciting, or otherwise involved
in criminality, the detention engendered by retaining her identification during the
warrants check was unjustified under Ray. Id. atffi[13-17.The trial court erred in
concluding otherwise. Id.
(State's Brief of Appellee (S.B.) at 6 (citing Ray, 2000 UT App 55,ffl[13-17).)The
unlawful level-two detention tainted the subsequent arrest and search incident thereto.
(Brief of Appellant.)
Notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous ruling, the state is asking this Court to
affirm the trial court's order. According to the state, alternative grounds for affirmance
exist: the inevitable-discovery doctrine is applicable to this case under Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984), and U.S. v. Larsen. 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.
2
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denied, 522 U.S. 1140(1998). (S.B. at 7-11.)1
The state is incorrect. Its argument is unpersuasive for the following reasons: (A)
The state failed to raise the issue of inevitable discovery in the trial court. Thus, the issue
may not be raised for the first time on appeal (see point A., infra). (B) Also, the state
failed to present any evidence in the trial court to support application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine to this case. There is no evidence that officers were engaged in, or
contemplated commencing, an independent investigation that inevitably would lead to
the discovery of the controlled substance. (See point B., infra).
Inasmuch as the state admits the officers violated Topanotes's rights under the
Fourth Amendment, Topanotes respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing the
trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,
390 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.

1
The state acknowledges that this Court's ruling in State v. James, 1999 UT App
17, 977 P.2d 489, cert, granted, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999), precludes application of the
inevitable-discovery doctrine to this case. (S.B. at 8 n.2.) Thus, Ray, 2000 UT App 55,
HTJ13-15, and James compel reversal of this matter on the grounds that the officers
violated Topanotes's rights under the Fourth Amendment.
To the extent the state is asking this Court to overrule its decision in James, this
Court should decline such a request for several reasons. First, it is not necessary to reach
the merits of the state's claim since the evidence in this case fails to support application
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. Second, the state has misapplied the inevitablediscovery doctrine as set forth in United States Supreme Court case law. Thus, the state's
claim that James should be overruled is irrelevant. Third, in State v. Ostler, 2000 UT
App 28, If 7, 996 P.2d 1065, 1067, this Court stated that it is "bound by the doctrine of
stare decisis and cannot overrule another panel's ruling." ljL_ Thus, James is controlling.
Pursuant to that case, the inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable. That ends the
analysis.

3
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The state does not dispute the following facts in its brief: Officers first
encountered Topanotes in front of her home. The encounter began as a level-one
consensual stop. During the encounter, "Sgt. Hansen identified himself as a police
officer and asked defendant if she had any identification (R. 88:10). When defendant
provided identification, Sgt. Hansen handed it to Officer Mitchell and asked him to call it
in for a warrants check." (S.B. at 3.) "Officers Hansen and Mitchell made plain that they
did not suspect defendant of solicitation or other criminal behavior when they
approached to question her about Thomas, the prostitute they had just arrested, and
whose identity and residence they were attempting to verify (R. 88:16,28)." (S.B. at 6.)2
The facts also reflect that the warrants check took five minutes and revealed that

2 To be clear, officers did not have reasonable information or suspicions that Topanotes
was involved in prostitution or any other criminal activity. Indeed, prior to the detention
in this matter, officers were investigating the address of the arrested person, Glenna
Thomas. (R. 88:8, 11, 13, 25.) Thomas claimed to live at a trailer address with another
alleged prostitute. (R. 88:8.) When Mitchell and Hansen went to the trailer to confirm
Thomas' address, no one was home. (R. 88:25.)
The officers went to the owner's home on the premises and learned that Thomas
had misrepresented the matter; according to the owner of the premises, Thomas did not
live at the trailer. Rather, a "short Indian girl by the name of Pearl" lived there. (R. 88:9,
25-26.) The facts support the determination that Thomas could not be trusted. She had
misrepresented her residential information. Officers properly determined that Thomas's
spurious allegations concerning another alleged prostitute likewise could not be trusted.
(See R. 88:16, 28 (when officers encountered Topanotes, they had no reason to believe
she was involved in criminal activity).) Thus, as the state acknowledges, officers lacked
reasonable articulable suspicion that Topanotes was involved in criminal activity. (See
S.B. at 3-4 and 6): see State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (second-hand
information from officer concerning defendant was insufficient to support further
detention).

4
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Topanotes had warrants outstanding for her arrest. Officers arrested Topanotes and
searched her incident thereto. (S.B. at 3.) During the search, officers discovered heroin.
The discovery gave rise to the charge for possession of a controlled substance in this
case. (R. 7-8.)
At the point when Officer Hansen failed to return Topanotes's identification card
to her, the matter escalated to an unlawful level-two detention/seizure. (S.B. at 4; Brief
of Appellant); Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^[17. The unlawful level-two detention in this case
tainted the subsequent arrest and search incident thereto. (Brief of Appellant); Salt Lake
Citv v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55. ^[13.
ARGUMENT
THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH IN NIX
AND LARSENIS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
The state argues for the application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine as a basis
for affirming the trial court's ruling in this matter. That doctrine does not apply here.
The Exclusionary Rule: It is well established that when officers engage in an
illegal search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained in connection
therewith will be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a
remedy for a constitutional violation. See Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (rule is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). The rule compels respect
for the Fourth Amendment, deters police from invading homes and interfering with an
individual's personal sanctity in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and removes the

5
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incentive to disregard the constitutional guaranty.
The Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine: The "inevitable-discovery" doctrine is a
limited exception to the exclusionary rule. It considers, among other things, whether the
illegally seized evidence would have been discovered through the use of lawful,
predictable, independent investigatory procedures and whether the procedures inevitably
would have resulted in the discovery of the evidence in question. Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 444 (1984). The inevitable-discovery doctrine is not an alternative "exception"
to the Fourth Amendment requirement.3 It is a fact-intensive doctrine that applies only in
limited circumstances to block application of the exclusionary rule.
The United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized the inevitable-discovery
doctrine in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 431. In that case, officers believed defendant
dumped a young girl's body near a road, ditch, culvert or abandoned building between
two points on the map. kLat 435. An officer in charge of searching the area began the
process of marking off maps between the two points in a grid fashion, separating 200
volunteers into teams, and assigning them to search specific grid areas. Id.at 435, 44849. Volunteers were instructed to concentrate their efforts on roadsides, culverts,
ditches, and abandoned buildings. IdL.
After volunteers began searching, defendant disclosed the location of the body

3 Exceptions to the warrant requirement include consent, plain view, incident to arrest,
and "probable cause to search plus exigent circumstances." State v. Lambert. 710 P.2d
693, 698 (Kan. 1985).
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

during an unlawful interrogation. Id. The body was located near a roadside ditch in an
area to be searched under the grid system. IcL at 449. The Nix Court ruled that discovery
of the body was inevitable as supported by the officers1 testimony concerning the lawful,
independent investigation relating to the search for the body. Id.at 449-50. Thus, the
unlawful interrogation, which actually led to the discovery, was harmless. See id.
The Nix Court applied the doctrine where the prosecutor presented specific facts
in the trial court to support the determination that a lawful, predictable, independent,
active investigation inevitably would have led to the discovery. As set forth below, the
state here is unable to meet the Nix standard.
A. THE STATE FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF INEVITABLEDISCOVERY IN THE COURT BELOW: IT MAY NOT BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
The state is seeking application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine as an
alternative basis for affirming the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. This
Court has ruled that the "doctrine of affirming the trial court's ruling on other proper
grounds" is applicable only if the basis is "apparent on the record." State v. Montoya,
937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n.
461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969)). "If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the
first time on appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of affirming on any
proper ground has no application." IdL.
In this case, application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine as a unique remedy to
the constitutional violation is not apparent from the record. The state did not argue the
7
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issue below or present evidence in the trial court concerning the matter. (See record in
general.) Topanotes was not on notice of the possible application of such a unique
remedy and she had no opportunity to cross-examine Officers Hansen or Mitchell in
connection with its possible application. See Montoya. 937 P.2d at 149; see also Hayes
v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 n.l (1985) (prosecution asked Court to apply inevitablediscovery doctrine as an exception to the exclusionary rule; Court declined since
exception was not presented in the lower courts); see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 937 n.4 (1995).
The state suggests that "[to] the extent [] there is any question on this record as to
the applicability of the inevitable-discovery rule, the proper remedy is remand to allow
the trial court to make that fact sensitive determination in the first instance." (S.B. at 11
n.3.) That state's suggestion is inappropriate, for the following reasons:
The state bears the burden of proof in establishing application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine. Nix. 467 U.S. at 444. In this case, the state filed papers relating to
its position on the Fourth Amendment issue, participated in oral argument, and presented
witnesses to testify. (R. 67-71; 88; 98.) The state has not suggested that it was denied a
full and fair opportunity to present evidence that it deemed relevant to the matter.
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered findings and conclusions
relating to the Terry stop and search incident to arrest. The trial court made its ruling in
connection with the specific facts the state chose to present. There is nothing in the
record relating to the inevitable-discovery doctrine since the state chose not to present
8
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evidence concerning the matter.
As a result of failing to elicit information concerning the inevitable-discovery
doctrine, the state failed to develop a factual predicate in the trial court to justify
application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine and it failed in its burden of proof. The
state's failure to meet its burden is a sufficient basis for ruling that the inevitablediscovery doctrine is inapplicable. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App.
1994) (trial court's order denying motion to suppress reversed where the state failed to
present sufficient evidence to justify its position under the Fourth Amendment); State v.
Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995) ("[On] the basis of the evidence now on
the record, this search should not be upheld"; state failed to present sufficient evidence);
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 903 (Utah App. 1993) (based on the evidence the state
elected to present in the trial court, case would not be remanded for fiirther proceedings;
the state's evidence was insufficient to uphold confession under Miranda); Barnett v.
U.S., 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (where government failed to overcome its burden
of proof, it would not be given second chance on remand).
Inasmuch as the state chose not to present evidence concerning the inevitablediscovery doctrine, the doctrine is inapplicable to this case. Topanotes respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
B. THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE SINCE
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE DETERMINATION THAT
OFFICERS CONTEMPLATED OR WERE ENGAGED IN AN
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION THAT WOULD HAVE LED TO THE
DISCOVERY OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
9
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While the state acknowledges that it bears the burden of establishing application
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine by a preponderance of the evidence (S.B. at 7), the
state also seems to assert that so long as it is able to speculate as to what might have
occurred "if the investigation had continued without the illegality," the doctrine may
apply as an exception to the exclusionary rule. (S.B. at 7.) That is, according to the
state, the prosecution is not required to present "absolute proof of what would have
"hypothetically occurred absent the illegality" to apply the doctrine. Rather, the
prosecution is required only to present "evidence of predictable police routine" and an
argument as to what would have "hypothetically occurred" if officers had complied with
the law. (S.B. at 7.) The state's argument supplants evidence of a predictable,
"independent investigation" under Nix with revisionist history. The state proposes to rewrite history in this case to support its purpose.
The state's approach to the doctrine is speculative and contrary to Nix. In that
case, the Court emphasized that the inevitable-discovery doctrine is not based in
speculation. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, n.5. Rather, its application relies on "demonstrated
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment." Id.4 That is, the
government is required to present basic, primary evidence of the independent, lawful

4 "Historical facts" are facts that are admitted and established in evidence. See.Omelas.
v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). They include a recital of the events and credibility
determinations. The historical facts serve as a basis for the trial court's factual findings.
See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1995). If the historical facts are
lacking, the proponent has failed in its burden of proof. See State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d
684, 687 (Utah 1990).
10
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investigation to support application of the doctrine.
Indeed, the factual determinations in Nix were capable of verification or
impeachment. There, the prosecutor presented evidence in the trial court that ~ absent
the unlawful conduct — officers would have discovered the young girl's body in
connection with an independent, lawful investigation. The evidence of the independent,
lawful investigation consisted of the following:
[T]he prosecution offered the testimony of Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of
Criminal Investigation. Ruxlow had organized and directed some 200 volunteers
who were searching for the child's body. Tr. of Hearings on Motion to Suppress
in State v. Williams, No. CR 55805, p. 34 (May 31, 1977). The searchers were
instructed "to check all the roads, the ditches, any culverts .... If they came upon
any abandoned farm buildings, they were instructed to go onto the property and
search those abandoned farm buildings or any other places where a small child
could be secreted." Id., at 35. Ruxlow testified that he marked off highway maps
of Poweshiek and Jasper Counties in grid fashion, divided the volunteers into
teams of four to six persons, and assigned each team to search specific grid areas.
Id., at 34. Ruxlow also testified that, if the search had not been suspended
because of [defendant's] promised cooperation, it would have continued into Polk
County, using the same grid system. Id., at 36, 39-40. Although he had
previously marked off into grids only the highway maps of Poweshiek and Jasper
Counties, Ruxlow had obtained a map of Polk County, which he said he would
have marked off in the same manner had it been necessary for the search to
continue. Id., at 39.
There was testimony that it would have taken an additional three to five hours to
discover the body if the search had continued; the body was found near a culvert,
one of the kinds of places the teams had been specifically directed to search.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-449.
Likewise, in Larsen. 127 F.3d at 987, also relied upon by the state, (S.B. at 7), the
court looked to the primary facts of record in the trial court to determine application of
the doctrine. In that case, officers obtained a warrant allowing them to seize certain
11
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vehicles on defendant's property. While the officers were executing the warrant, they
seized numerous unauthorized items, including "bank records." Larsen. 127 F.3d at 985.
After the items were seized, a state trooper involved in executing the warrant,
stopped at the local bank for personal reasons. He mentioned to the bank vice-president
that he had recovered vehicles from defendant's property. The bank vice-president
"became concerned because the bank had loaned money to [defendant] for a vehicle."
Id. The vice-president independently pulled his records on the matter and sent them to
the crime division of the FDIC. The crime division forwarded the records to Agent
Crabtree of the FBI. Id
Meanwhile, the state troopers who had executed the search warrant likewise
determined to send the illegally seized "bank records" to Crabtree. Id.
Crabtree investigated the matter, "issued subpoenas and, in accordance with
standard FBI procedures, began tracing [defendant's] banking activities. This led to
issuance of subpoenas by a grand jury and discovery of the bank records on which
[defendant's] prosecution for federal bank fraud and money laundering was based." L±_
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence on the basis that officers exceeded the
scope of the warrant during the initial search and poisoned all evidence discovered
thereafter. The district court agreed and determined the excessive warrants search was
unlawful. However, that court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ruled that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied and would block application
of the exclusionary rule. The facts supported the determination that Crabtree would have
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discovered the fraudulent transaction in connection with his independent, predictable,
lawful investigation of the bank records from the vice-president. Id.at 986-87.
We conclude the inevitable-discovery exception applies whenever an independent
investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of the evidence, whether or
not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal police conduct.
*

*

*

When the challenged evidence also has an independent source or would inevitably
have been discovered by independent lawful means, exclusion of the evidence
"would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any
error or violation."
Id. at 986 (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443). The court in Larsen was not required to rely on
revisionist history, or speculative hypothetical events to find that the inevitable-discovery
doctrine applied. Rather, the facts of record established that an independent, lawful,
predictable, investigation into the bank records existed.
Pursuant to Nix and Larsen, the inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable to
Topanotes's case as a matter of law and a matter of record. That is, the state failed to
present evidence to support application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine (see point
B.I.). While the state argues that the warrants check was "predictable police routine"
and hypothetically could have been separated from the illegal conduct, there is no
evidence to support that assertion (see.point B.2.). Also, as a matter of law, the warrants
check in this case was not "routine." It was unlawful, thereby supporting the determination that the "routine" check in this case could not support application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine. (See point B.3.). Topanotes addresses each subpoint below.
1. The State Failed to Present Evidence that Officers Were Involved in an
Independent Investigation Relating to Topanotes.
13
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In the lower court proceedings, officers testified to the existence of only one
investigation in this matter: the investigation that resulted in the unlawful, level-two
detention and arrest. There is no evidence that officers were engaged in or contemplated
any other independent investigation concerning Topanotes, and there is no indication that
officers contemplated or believed they inevitably would discover heroin in Topanotes's
pocket if they had pursued an independent, lawful course of action. In the absence of
compelling facts to support the existence of an independent, predictable, lawful
investigation, the inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at
987; see also Nix. 467 U.S. at 448-49.
2. The State Claims that Officers Hypothetically Could Have Conducted a
Warrants Check Without the Illegal Detention as a Matter of Routine Practice, and
That Such a Warrants Check Would Be Sufficient to Invoke Application of the
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine. The Record Fails to Support the State's Position.
The state seems to argue that the record in this case contains evidence of a lawful
"predictable police routine," where officers could have conducted the warrants check
without engaging in an unlawful detention. (S.B. at 8-10.) According to the state, based
on the evidence of the "routine" practice, this Court may apply the inevitable-discovery
doctrine to determine that police hypothetically could have discovered Topanotes's
outstanding warrants without the illegality. (S.B. at 7-10.)
The state's argument is insupportable; the record does not contain evidence of a
lawful "predictable police routine." Rather, it contains evidence that officers engaged in
a "routine practice" that involved an unlawful level-two detention. Specifically, the
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record reflects the following:
Officer Hansen encountered Topanotes outside her trailer home and requested an
identification card. Topanotes produced a card and gave it to Hansen. Thereafter,
Hansen handed the card to Mitchell, who walked away with the card to run the warrants
check, while Topanotes remained detained. The entire unlawful procedure was
"common practice" for the officers. (R. 88:22.) Furthermore, the officers did not detain
Topanotes because they "suspected any criminal activity on Ms. Topanotes's part." (R.
88:16, 28.) Rather, the detention occurred "as a matter of routine" practice. (R. 88:16.)
The "routine practice" as described in this case consisted of detaining an
individual for a warrants check without reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. The "routine" described in the record was unlawful. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,
1Hfl7, 20. There is no evidence of a lawful "predictable routine practice," to support the
state's argument.
Next, the state asserts the following:
[N]o information necessary to performing the warrants check was obtained during
the course of the illegal detention in this case. Thus, the instant warrants check
was not at all dependent upon the illegal detention for its successful completion It would have been conducted with or without physical retention of defendant's
identification (R. 88:16, 22, 28). It was therefore inevitable that police would
discover defendant's outstanding warrants and that she would be arrested thereon.
(S.B. at 10). That is incorrect.
Contrary to the state's assertion, the "information necessary to performing the
warrants check" (S.B. at 10) was obtained during the course of the illegal detention.
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Again, as the record reflects, Hansen stopped Topanotes outside the trailer and
requested the identification card. Topztnotes produced a card and gave it to Hansen.
Hansen reviewed the card then failed to return it; he retained possession of the card.
At the point where Hansen retained the card, the matter escalated to an unlawful
level-two detention. (See S.B. at 6.) Hansen subsequently gave the identification card to
Mitchell. At that point, Mitchell obtained information from the retained card and ran a
warrants check. Thus, contrary to the state's assertion, Mitchell obtained the necessary
information during the course of the illegal detention.
In this case, the record fails to support that the officers considered conducting the
warrants check "with or without physical retention of defendant's identification" and
"with or without the detention." (S.B. at 9, 10.) Indeed, the officers were never asked
whether they routinely conducted warrants checks without detaining the individual, or
whether they contemplated or considered running a warrants check in this case without
"detention" or "physical retention of defendant's identification." Thus, the inevitablediscovery doctrine is inapplicable under the circumstances. See Nix. 467 U.S. at 444
(prosecution must establish inevitable discovery by "lawful means").
Since the state has failed to present evidence to support that officers contemplated
a "routine" warrants check without an unlawful detention, the state's argument must be
rejected. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); 50 West Broadway Assoc.
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v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989V5
3. Utah Case Law Permits Officers to Conduct a Warrants Check During a
Citizen Encounter as a Matter of "Routine Practice" in Connection with a Lawful
Level-Two Detention, or As a Caretaking Function in Connection with the
Citizen's Operation of a Vehicle. Neither Scenario Exists Here, Making a
"Routine" Warrants Check During the Encounter Unlawful Under the
Circumstances.
Finally, as a matter of law, the state's argument is flawed. The state's argument
seems to be premised on the notion that a "warrants check" may be conducted during a
level-one, pedestrian encounter as a matter of lawful, "predictable police routine" (S.B. at
4, 9-10.)

5
Assuming arguendo officers considered running a warrants check without
retaining Topanotes's card and without detaining her, it is unclear how that would have
been accomplished. For example, after Hansen reviewed the identification card, if he
returned it to Topanotes, who ran the warrants check? According to the facts, it was not
Hansen. The warrants check was performed by Mitchell. Thus, under the state's
hypothetical, how did Mitchell obtain the identification information from Hansen to run
the check? Did he get it from Hansen? If so, did the officers have to detain Topanotes in
order that Hansen could provide the identification information to Mitchell for the
warrants check? That would be unlawful. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (the leap from
asking a person's name and date of birth to running a warrants check severed the chain of
rational inference from specific and articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to
support an as yet "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'").
Also, assuming arguendo officers did not engage in an illegal detention/retention,
when Officer Hansen hypothetically returned the card to Topanotes, was she free to go?
If so, did she? If she left, did the officers continue with the warrants check? If so, did
they find Topanotes after they completed the check, and where? Was she in her trailer or
did she leave the area? If she went to the trailer, did she change her clothes? Since the
hypothetical is unclear and unpredictable with respect to the facts, it does not lend itself
to application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
The state's hypothetical facts emphasize the importance of basic evidence to
support application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. In this case, the facts of record
support the determination that officers unlawfully escalated the matter and failed to
identify reasonable articulable suspicion to support the detention.
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In considering the law on the matter, Utah appellate courts have upheld a warrants
check during a citizen encounter as a lawful, "routine" practice in connection with a
level-two detention traffic stop or as a caretaking function when defendant has indicated
an intent to operate a vehicle. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994);
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d431, 435 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d
913, 917 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah App. 1996);
State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Chapman, 921
P.2d 446, 451-53 (Utah 1996); State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Utah 1994)
(defendant offered to drive car when driver was arrested; defendant could not produce
license, entitling officers to run computer/warrants check as proper caretaking function).
Those conditions do not exist here. (See_S.B. at 6 (state acknowledges that leveltwo detention in this case was unlawful).)
Utah appellate courts also have recognized such a lawful, routine practice where
officers have identified facts supporting reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant
has been or is involved in criminal activity. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985, 988 (Utah
App. 1994); Bountiful Citv v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990); Salt Lake Citv
v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003,1006-07 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765,
769 (Utah App. 1990) (defendant drove into a parking lot and approached officer, who
followed him; because defendant had just been driving, officer requested license, which
defendant claimed "had been taken;" officer had reasonable suspicion to believe
defendant was driving without a valid license, and ran warrants checks).
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Those conditions do not exist here. (See.S.B. at 6 (state acknowledges that
officers failed to identify reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity).)
Where officers have failed to identify reasonable articulable suspicion that
defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime, as in Topanotes's case, Utah
appellate courts have not been willing to justify detention for a warrants check as a
matter of authority or "routine practice." See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah
1991); State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988-89 (Utah App. 1992). Thus, the state's
argument is unpersuasive as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial judge's ruling on the motion to suppress evidence.
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